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Abstract 
 
Background: Interpersonal trust is an important target for the conceptualization, identification, and treatment of psychiatric 
disorders marked by interpersonal difficulties. A core feature of adolescent externalising disorders is interpersonal impairment. 
However, research investigating trust is scarce. A relatively novel approach for studying trust in psychopathology is through 
examination of social decision making using behavioural economic games. 
Objective: To employ a modified trust game in order to determine whether externalising adolescents exhibit perturbed 
decision making in social and/or nonsocial contexts. 
Methods: Externalising inpatient adolescents (n = 141) and non-externalising psychiatric controls (n = 122) completed self-
report measures of psychopathology and invested in an iterative trust game played under two conditions: social (trust) and 
nonsocial (lottery condition), each consisting of five consecutive trials. 
Results: Externalising adolescents showed a limited increase in trust investments, compared to a significant increase in lottery 
investments, across early game trials relative to psychiatric controls. This significant three-way interaction between 
experimental group, game condition, and trials became most evident at the second trial of games. Between-group differences 
on trust investments were non-significant. However, externalising adolescents invested significantly less in the trust relative 
to lottery condition, an effect unobserved in psychiatric controls.  
Conclusions: This study tentatively suggests that adolescent externalising disorders may be associated with an insensitivity to 
normative social exchange which may arise, in part, from a lack of anticipated co-player reciprocity. It is not the level of trust 
that may distinguish externalising adolescents but perhaps the form of which the trust exchange takes shape. Conclusions are 
tempered by the fact that the employed trust game did not include feedback in the form of co-player repayments. 
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Introduction 
Externalising disorders refer to a class of psychiatric 
disorders characterised by antisocial behaviour, 
aggression, rule-breaking, impulsivity, and 
overactivity (1-3) and typically include conduct 
disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, ADHD, 
antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, and 
features of borderline personality disorder (BPD). 
Interpersonal difficulties form a core feature of most 
externalising disorders. An important target for the 
conceptualization, identification, and treatment of 
psychiatric disorders with interpersonal impairment, 
such as externalising disorders, is interpersonal trust 
(hereon referred to as trust) which can be measured 
through behavioural decision making (4). Research 
investigating the association between behavioural 
trust and externalising disorders, however, has been 
scarce. 
Historically, a leading approach for understanding 
interpersonal problems associated with externalising 
disorders in children and adolescents has been to 
examine the social-cognitive deficits and distortions 
associated with these disorders. These studies have 
been guided by either the social information 
processing (SIP) or theory of mind (ToM) 
approaches (5). While the impact of the SIP and ToM 
has been substantial in elucidating the deficits and 
distortions underlying social decision making in child 
and adolescent externalising disorders, there are 
theoretical and methodological limitations to these 
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approaches (6). Both are based on the theoretical 
assumption that social cognition is a property of the 
person and not the relationship or the interaction 
between two or more people. This approach ignores 
the stochastic (online) nature of social interaction, 
which is intrinsically dynamic with one’s thoughts 
and actions depending upon moment-to-moment 
changes in others’ actions (and mental states) (7). 
Conceptualising social cognition as a person-
characteristic results in utilisation of tasks that are 
typically “off-line” by virtue of reliance on 
hypothetical scenarios thereby limiting participant 
investment. Tasks are not administered in real time, 
do not sample actual social interactions, and are 
unlikely to elicit full emotional and behavioural 
engagement. Most social-cognitive tasks are also 
characterised by an over-reliance on self-report, 
thereby “pulling for thinking” and eliciting socially 
desirable responses (8). 
To address some of these limitations, there has 
been a steady increase in the use of behavioural 
economic tasks to provide more ecologically valid 
paradigms for examining social decision making in 
externalising disorders (6). These paradigms allow for 
the mathematical parameterisation of constructs 
such as trust, fairness, reciprocity, social discounting 
and so on. All of these constructs and their associated 
experimental paradigms have mostly been developed 
from game theory, such that games consist of a set 
of real or imagined players who have a series of 
options or strategies to choose from in order to 
maximise pay-off. By varying task characteristics, 
seemingly simple games can be adapted to probe a 
remarkable range of social phenomena including 
social influence, prosocial behaviour, trust, social 
norm violations, social-cognitive biases, and higher-
order social cognition (9). 
In the context of behavioural economics, trust is 
defined as an exchange between two players in which 
cooperation and defection can be parametrically 
encoded as the amount of money designated for the 
partner. The basic one-shot trust game was initially 
proposed by Camerer and Weigelt (10) and further 
developed by Berg et al. (11). One player (the 
Investor) is endowed with a certain amount of 
money (or points as proxies for money). The 
Investor can keep all the money or decide to “invest” 
some amount with the partner (the Trustee). The 
amount invested is tripled in value as it is sent to the 
Trustee, who then decides what portion to return to 
the Investor.  
The trust game has been used in several studies of 
healthy children and adolescents (e.g., ages 8 through 
17+) (12-14). In the first study to use the trust game 
to study externalising behaviour problem in youth 
(15), two groups of boys (externalising vs. non-
externalising; ages 8–18) recruited from the 
community played a one-shot (single round) trust 
game under two conditions: an anonymous version 
where the identity of the trust game partner was not 
known and a “known identity” version where 
identities were revealed prior to the game. Results 
showed that boys with externalising problems 
exhibited similar trust behaviour (mean investments) 
compared to non-externalising boys regardless of 
condition. While this study is informative, a 
community sample of boys was recruited thereby 
limiting generalisations to clinical populations and 
the disease mechanisms associated with externalising 
behaviour. Moreover, the one-shot nature of the 
game utilised does not fully exploit the fact that 
models (representations) of interaction partners 
build over time and multiple rounds (16).  
An additional consideration stems from the fact 
that since heightened risk taking is characteristic of 
externalising disorders (17, 18), it is therefore 
important to distinguish in which context(s), 
specifically, risk taking is elevated. The multi-trial 
trust task developed by Kosfeld et al. (19) offers a 
useful opportunity to do just that by providing the 
means to examine sensitivity to social risk taking 
versus risk taking in general. This task was utilized by 
Unoka et al. (20) with adult participants who were 
asked to invest money in an internet game where the 
pay-off depended on the intention of another person 
(trust game) or on luck (risk “lottery” condition). 
Interestingly, adults with BPD in this study showed a 
non-linear increase in investments across trials in the 
lottery condition, without similar investment increase 
in the trust game, whereas healthy control 
comparison adults showed a linear increase in 
investments regardless of condition. In other words, 
individuals with BPD exhibited different investment 
strategies over time as a function of game condition.  
Against this background, the current study had two 
aims. The first aim was to use a multi-round trust task 
(19) in a clinical sample of adolescents to examine 
trust behaviour in relation to externalising problems. 
Given our prior work (15) demonstrating a non-
significant association between externalising 
problems and trust, we did not expect a main effect 
for externalising problems such that those above cut-
off on externalising problems would invest similar to 
non-externalising adolescents in the trust game. We 
did, however, expect that adolescents with 
externalising problems would be insensitive to task 
type compared to non-externalising subjects who 
would show differential investments as a function of 
game condition (trust versus lottery), exhibiting a 
linear increase when playing with a person (versus the 
lottery). Therefore, we expected a significant three-
way interaction effect between group, task type (trust 
versus lottery), and trials. Such an interaction effect 
would fit with our prior research demonstrating a 
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general insensitivity to normative social exchange for 
externalising problems (15, 21) and other disorders 
with externalising features like BPD (22). 
Hypotheses were tested only after considering the 
potential confounding effects of age (14) and sex (23) 
as both variables associate with adolescent trust game 
investment. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the acute adolescent 
inpatient psychiatric unit of a county hospital serving 
the indigent population of a large metropolitan area 
in the USA. Inclusion criteria required participants to 
be between 12 and 17 years old and possess English 
fluency. Participants were excluded if the attending 
psychiatrist determined s/he did not have adequate 
capacity to participate in the study, which included 
the presence of mental retardation, active psychosis, 
or posing physical risk to research staff. The inpatient 
setting did not allow for structured intelligence 
assessments; however, participants were excluded if 
s/he repeated one or more academic grade which 
served as a proxy for intellectual/cognitive 
functioning. It was important to exclude any 
potentially low-functioning adolescents as it was 
critical that s/he fully understand the experimental 
task and instructions for gameplay. 
A total of 345 adolescent inpatients were recruited 
for the present study. However, 37 participants 
providing consent/assent were excluded for 
repeating one or more school years, 25 were not 
administered the experimental task, 16 did not 
complete psychopathology self-report measures, two 
did not complete both the task and self-reports, and 
two provided consent but were unavailable to 
participate due to assessment scheduling difficulty. 
Thus, a remaining sample of 263 adolescents was 
included in analyses. In total, 141 adolescents 
(53.6%) met inclusion criteria for externalising 
problems and 122 (46.4%) did not, which designated 
them as psychiatric controls. The average participant 
age was 14.75 years (SD = 1.50) and 67.7% were 
female. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the total 
sample was 34.6% Hispanic, 26.6% African–
American, 30.4% white, and 5.4% multiracial with 
3% self-identifying as other. 
 
Measures 
Experimental task 
Unoka et al.’s (20) modified trust game was played 
under two counterbalanced conditions, each 
consisting of five consecutive trials. One condition 
(social condition) assessed interpersonal trust 
exchanges between the participant and an 
anonymous (fictional) peer co-player. A fully 
anonymous co-player was used as anonymity begets 
generalised trust, which underlies all social 
interactions (14, 24). In each round, the participant, 
always acting as the investor, allocated anywhere 
between 0 and 12 monetary units (MUs) to their co-
player (the trustee). As MUs were sent, they were 
tripled along the way. Participants were told that the 
trustee would then decide how many MUs to send 
back to the investor for each trial. In the second 
condition (nonsocial condition), the structure of the 
game was identical though instead of a co-player a 
computerised lottery system randomly determined 
repayment. The amount of MUs invested by the 
participant indicated the degree of trust in the other 
player or degree of general risk taking in the lottery 
condition. During both conditions, subjects did not 
receive feedback after each trial regarding the 
amount of repayment of investments. The absence 
of feedback creates uncertainty in the outcome of the 
decision making therefore ensuring risk taking (19). 
 
Task administration  
Games were explained to participants via 
PowerPoint presentation, and participants were 
informed that the objective of each game was to earn 
as many MUs as possible and that MUs were equally 
valuable to both players, but that they would not be 
told of their cumulative earnings until afterwards. 
Players were informed that the order of games would 
be randomly determined. Participants’ 
demonstration of understanding of game rules was 
required prior to administration. The assessor then 
pretended to make contact with a co-administrator 
via cell phone to ensure that the (fictional) trustee 
was “logged on” to play. Games were designed to 
mimic an online computer game and were played on 
Inquisit 2.0 software (25). Participants were first 
presented with a screen that confirmed they were 
being connected to the game (i.e. “Please wait while 
the other player logs on…”). After each trial 
investment, participants were told to please wait 
while the other player (or lottery) determined how 
many points were sent back. Given that deception 
was used (there was no trustee and cumulative points 
were not calculated), players were debriefed 
immediately following administration, in compliance 
with ethical standards (26). S/he was specifically 
asked not to share details about the experimental task 
with other patients to avoid contamination. High 
turnover rates on the unit further protected against 
contamination. No adolescent reported any negative 
feelings about the deception or the experiment. 
 
Psychopathology 
The Youth Self Report (YSR) (27) is a well-
established evidence-based assessment instrument 
that assesses global and specific psychopathology 
over the preceding six months among youth ages 11 
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to 18 years. The YSR consists of 112 problem items 
rated 0 (Not true), 1 (Somewhat or Sometimes true), 
or 2 (Very true or Often true). Relevant sample items, 
among others, include “I disobey my parents,” “I 
steal at home,” “I drink alcohol without my parents 
approval,” and “I run away from home.” For the 
present study, the externalising problems scale 
(includes rule-breaking behaviour and aggressive 
behaviour subscales) was used in order to explore 
broadband, rather than disorder specific, relations 
with trust behaviour in keeping with the focus of the 
study on externalising problems as a broader 
category of psychopathology. The recommended 
cut-off for clinical threshold (t-score ≥ 65) was used 
to delineate adolescents with and without 
externalising problems (27). Internal consistency for 
the externalising problems scale, as measured by 
Cronbach’s α, was 0.88 in the current study.  
 
Procedures 
The study was approved by the appropriate 
institutional review board. Adolescents admitted to 
the 16-bed adolescent acute inpatient unit psychiatric 
unit at a county hospital where the average length of 
stay is three–four days were approached on the day 
of admission about participating in this study. 
Parents were asked to provide consent, and, if given, 
adolescents were approached for assent. 
Assessments on the unit were routinely completed 
within two–three days of admission in quiet, private 
rooms well removed from the unit’s community area. 
Clinical psychology graduate students (or other 
research staff) conducted assessments only after 
completing training under supervision of the 
principal investigator. Participation was completely 
voluntary and withdrawal was permitted without 
justification. Gift cards to a popular nation-wide 
retail department store chain were provided as 
compensation. 
 
Data analytic strategy 
χ2 tests of independence and independent samples t-
tests compared groups on sociodemographic and 
clinical variables with effect sizes reported in Cohen’s 
d and Cramer V statistics, respectively. Game order 
effects (a potential result of counterbalancing) were 
tested prior to conducting primary analyses. A three-
way full-factorial repeated measures ANCOVA, with 
group as the between-subjects factor and game type 
and trials as within-subject factors, was then 
performed for primary analyses with effect sizes 
reported in partial-eta squared (η2). Effect sizes for η2 
were considered small, medium, or large at values of 
0.01, 0.06, and 0.14, respectively (28). In addition to 
Bonferronni-corrected post hoc tests, within-group 
paired-samples t-tests were conducted to tease apart 
significant interactions. The identification of age and 
sex as covariates was a priori and objective (29).  
 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
See Table 1 for sample sociodemographic 
characteristics, externalising problems, and mean 
investments per game condition. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Sample characteristics and group comparison results 
 Externalizing problems 
(n = 141) 
Psychiatric controls 
(n = 1.22) t/χ2 p d 
Age (in years) 14.78 (1.43) 14.70 (1.58) 0.164 0.686 0.053 
Sex (% female) 68.80  66.40 0.172 0.678 0.026 
YSR externalizing 71.54 (5.97) 54.66 (7.25) 429.159 <0.001 2.542 
Mean Trust investment 4.56 (2.32) 4.95 (2.39) 1.736 0.189 0.166 
Lottery investment 4.87 (2.40) 4.82 (2.13) 0.037 0.847 0.022 
Race   6.56  0.341 0.163 
 African-American 40 (28.40%) 30 (24.60%)    
 Caucasian 42 (29.80%) 38 (31.10%)    
 Hispanic 44 (31.20%) 47 (38.50%)    
 Multiracial 10 (7.10%) 4 (3.30%)    
 Other 5 (3.50%) 3 (2.50%)    
Note. Data are mean (standard deviation) unless otherwise specified. Independent-sample t-tests and χ2 tests of independence were performed with 
effect sizes reported as Cohen’s d and Cramer’s V statistics, respectively 
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 FIGURE 1 a 
 
 
 Trust and lottery investments by experimental group 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 1 b 
 
 Trust and lottery investment = mean investment per group per trial with 95% CI standard error bars 
 
 
 
 
Testing for game condition order effects 
Game condition order effects were tested (i.e. trust 
followed by lottery, lottery followed by trust) prior to 
conducting primary analyses. There was no 
significant association between group and game 
condition order, p = 0.761. There were also non-
significant associations between order and mean 
investments in either game condition, p’s ≥ 0.189. 
Moreover, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions between game condition order and other 
factors, p-values ≥ 0.052. 
 
Trust and lottery investments 
A full-factorial three-way ANCOVA, controlling for 
age and sex, was conducted revealing a significant 
group  game  trials three-way interaction, F (4; 
259) = 2.57, p = 0.039, η2 = 0.010. Specifically, 
adolescents with externalising problems exhibited a 
greater linear increase in investments in the lottery 
condition versus trust game, whereas psychiatric 
controls’ investments showed a greater increase in 
the trust game versus lottery condition. As shown in 
Figure 1a and 1b, this interaction effect was 
pronounced over the first three trials of the game 
conditions. This significant three-way interaction 
precluded meaningful interpretation of the group  
game interaction effect, F (4; 259) = 4.84, p = 0.029, 
η2 = 0.018, and the main effect of group was non-
significant, p = 0.551. Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
tests showed that, despite starting at similar levels in 
trust game investment on Trial 1, it was at Trial 2 
when adolescents with externalising problems 
(marginal mean (MM) = 4.29, standard error (SE) = 
0.23, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 3.83 to 4.75) 
invested significantly less than psychiatric controls 
(MM = 5.22, SE = 0.25, 95% CI = 4.72 to 5.71), p = 
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0.007, η2 = 0.027. Within-group paired-samples t-
tests were conducted to further tease apart the three-
way interaction. Clarifying the group  game 
interaction, externalising adolescents invested less on 
average in the trust game compared to the lottery 
condition, t(140) = 2.09, p = 0.039, whereas 
psychiatric controls invested similarly in each game 
condition, p = 0.318. Between games, clarifying the 
three-way interaction, externalising adolescents 
invested comparatively less in the trust game versus 
lottery condition in Trial 2, t(140) = 2.00, p = 0.048, 
and Trial 3, t(140) = 3.31, p = 0.001. Psychiatric 
controls, in contrast, invested comparatively more in 
the trust game versus lottery condition in trial 2, 
t(121) = 3.30, p = 0.001. Additionally, considering 
sex, there were non-significant differences between 
girls and boys mean investments in either game 
condition (p’s ≥ 0.055). Full-factorial three-way 
analyses were repeated controlling for game 
condition order, given the trend-level effects 
observed in preliminary analyses, and results 
remained similar with a still significant group  game 
 trials interaction, p = 0.036, η2 = 0.010. 
 
Discussion 
The present study was the first to use a modified 
trust game with social (trust) and nonsocial (lottery) 
conditions to examine the association between 
adolescent externalising problems and trust 
behaviour. Consistent with hypotheses and prior 
work conducted by our research group (15), 
adolescents with externalising problems did not 
differ in terms of mean trust game investments 
versus non-externalising adolescents. However, the 
present study extends those prior findings by 
showing that mean trust among externalising 
adolescents is comparable to controls in a multi-
round format. Because real-life social interaction 
often occurs over several exchanges, rather than in 
single shots (16), the use of a multi-round format 
arguably increases ecological validity. Convergent 
results between the present study and our prior 
findings (21) indicate that disrupted interpersonal 
relations in externalising adolescents may not 
necessarily be due to a blanket mistrust in others as 
previously stipulated (31). Instead, interpersonal 
impairment in externalising disorders may be more 
about the form of the trust exchange (i.e. the rise 
and fall of investments) that is distinguishing. A 
caveat, perhaps, is that the present trust game was 
played with an anonymous co-player rather than one 
with a known identity. However, the choice to utilise 
co-player anonymity was in effort to tap into 
generalised trust, which is thought to underlie all 
social interactions (14, 24). This design 
consideration suggests findings may relate to 
broader interpersonal functioning. An important 
aside, given that the present sample was 
approximately 70% female, is that similar mean trust 
investments among externalising adolescents and 
controls does not appear to be exclusive to boys as 
shown in Sharp et al. (21). Non-significant effects of 
sex on mean investments in consistent with prior 
studies using this particular trust task (20, 32) but 
deviates from non-psychiatric research showing 
males to trust more than females (33, 34), including 
when interacting with unknown co-players (35). 
The observed three-way group  game condition 
 trials interaction provides mixed support for our 
second hypothesis. The statistical distinction 
between game condition investment strategies over 
time, albeit of a small effect size, paired with prior 
findings (15, 21) tentatively suggests that 
externalising adolescents may demonstrate an 
insensitivity to normative social exchange. This 
working hypothesis is of course tempered by the fact 
that the trust game employed did not include 
feedback in the form of co-player repayments and, 
furthermore, investments in trial 2 specifically 
appear to have been instrumental to the significant 
interaction effect. However, early in-game 
deviations from normative trust game behaviour, 
such as a failure to increase investments in early 
game rounds, could dissolve the social exchange as 
the trustee co-player will likely be less likely to 
cooperate; a social breakdown previously observed 
in adult studies of externalising disorder (22, 36). To 
this end, externalising adolescents invested 
approximately 10–20% less during rounds 2 and 3 
of the trust game relative to psychiatric controls who 
conformed to normative trust game investment 
strategies (allocating roughly half of game points; 
11). As the actualised impact of externalising 
adolescents’ investment strategy on co-player 
behaviour remains unknown in present context, a 
natural extension of this study that could clarify the 
speculative nature of these considerations would 
include a multi-round format trust game with an 
online peer co-player to capture the dynamic nature 
of trust social interaction.  
Contrary to hypotheses, externalising adolescents 
did in fact distinguish between tasks, demonstrating 
a lack of increased trust game investment compared 
to a sharper increase in investments in the lottery 
condition over multiple rounds. The comparatively 
reduced within-group investment across trust game 
rounds 2 and 3 potentially indicates externalising 
adolescents’ reduced anticipation of, or insensitivity 
and/or lack of responsivity to, “trustworthiness” 
(reciprocity) received from the trustee co-player. 
Given that it was not during the first trial when 
effects were observed suggests that perhaps 
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externalising adolescents were not simply being less 
altruistic or spiteful in their behaviour from the 
game’s start. Several factors may potentially help 
explain this phenomenon. For instance, 
externalising adolescents may expect malevolence 
on the part of the trustee, making them more averse 
to potential betrayal in the social exchange (16, 19, 
37). This point is affirmed by the fact that youthful 
trust game players generally recognise that repeated 
interactions with the same co-player present 
opportunities for cooperative social exchange (30). 
Externalising adolescents may have a negative, 
myopic view in this respect. Regarding the small 
effect size of the described three-way interaction, it 
may be important to consider that the control group 
was composed of psychiatric inpatients rather 
healthy community controls. Had the sample been 
composed of the latter, perhaps a greater effect size 
would have been evidenced. Coming full circle, 
reciprocity has been found to be a strong predictor 
of subsequent increases or decreases in trust 
behaviour (16) and diminished anticipation of 
reciprocity could be conceptually relevant for 
externalising adolescents. Per Unoka et al. (20), the 
absence of in-game feedback may have been a 
determinant. More broadly, considering economic 
theory, perhaps externalising adolescents elected to 
maximise their gains early on, whereas non-
externalising adolescents play the “long game,” 
relying on co-player reciprocity to help maximise 
their in-game earnings. Finally, individual 
differences associated with externalising disorders 
such as elevated reward sensitivity and impulsivity 
(38) may also have been a contributor to observed 
effects.  
Groups’ investment strategies for the lottery 
condition were surprisingly similar. The linear 
increase in investments observed among psychiatric 
controls contradicted our hypothesis that their 
investment increase would be unique to the trust 
game. There could be several plausible explanations 
for this finding. Perhaps, for instance, the 
computerised lottery sufficiently activated 
“trustworthy” expectancies (anticipated reciprocity) 
in turn resulting in a comparable increase in 
investments to trust game trials. The present control 
sample could also have had clinical and/or 
sociodemographic characteristics making them 
more susceptible, than other samples, to the 
manipulation of the lottery condition. What partially 
distinguished externalising adolescents, however, 
was the discrepancy between investments by game 
conditions. The limited increase (or relative 
decrease) in trust game investments among 
adolescents with externalising problems parallels 
findings by Sharp et al. (15) showing externalising 
adolescents to more strongly discount social reward 
compared to controls. 
Despite its strengths, the present study is not 
without important limitations. The portion of game 
points’ value attributed to the social interaction, 
rather than the economic value of the game points 
themselves, could not be isolated; however, this does 
not interfere with measuring the intended constructs 
(39). In an effort to increase participants’ emotional 
and behavioural engagement with the task, it would 
have been ideal had payout been tied to in-game 
performance (40). Then again, the same task 
administration has been successfully used in other 
studies without this payout contingency in place (32, 
41). Although SES went unmeasured, it may well 
have affected investment strategies and future studies 
may elect to include integrative measures such as the 
Hollingshead Four Factor Index of Social Status (42). 
Whether present findings generalise to clinically 
diagnosed inpatients is uncertain as group 
assignment relied on self-report rather than 
structured clinical interviews. Furthermore, to this 
end, any conclusion drawn with respect to the 
associations between trust and risk taking in specific 
externalising disorders is limited. Finally, the present 
trust game included an anonymous co-player, 
specifically, and future adolescent trust game studies 
may wish to include known and anonymous co-
player conditions as executed by Venta et al. (32). 
Limitations notwithstanding, an especially notable 
strength of the present study includes the utilisation 
of a modified trust game allowing for the joint 
examination of social (trust) and nonsocial (general 
risk taking) reward decision making, a consideration 
taken by relatively few behavioural economic studies 
to date. This distinction is important because such 
findings may help to clarify the particular 
circumstance(s) under which perturbations in reward 
system functioning in externalising adolescents may 
be evident.  
 
Clinical significance and conclusions 
In conclusion, externalising adolescents did not 
differ in mean investments in either game condition, 
be it social (trust) or nonsocial (lottery condition), as 
compared to non-externalising psychiatric controls 
suggesting trust and general risk taking is similar 
between patient groups. However, externalising 
adolescents did exhibit some potential form of an 
insensitivity to normative trust social exchange as 
shown by differential investment strategies across 
trials between game types relative to psychiatric 
controls. Although preliminary, this seemingly 
perturbed pattern of decision-making, captured 
uniquely in an interpersonal context, provides 
scientists and treatment providers alike with a highly 
specific, discrete aspect of interpersonal dysfunction 
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that appears associated with adolescent externalising 
disorders. In turn, clinicians are provided with what 
could be adopted as a new, precise target for 
therapeutic intervention for adolescents with 
externalising problems which, if made malleable, may 
serve as a foundational component in treatment for 
improved interpersonal functioning. Study findings 
may also assist in the future development of novel 
diagnostic and clinical behavioural decision-making 
assessment tools. Such tools could be applied at the 
onset of treatment with future administrations 
thereby serving as a measure of treatment progress in 
conjunction with other commonly used symptom 
measures and measures of interpersonal functioning. 
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